Tuesday, 11 April 2017

CASE REVIEW: Tan Sri Abdul Khalid Bin Ibrahim v Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad

1.0  INTRODUCTION
Journal:                        Malaysian Law Journal (MLJ)
Case:                           Tan Sri Abdul Khalid Bin Ibrahim v Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
Citation:                      [2012] 7 MLJ 597
Judge Panel:                Zawawi Salleh J
Reported by:               Kohila Nesan
Judgement Date:         2nd December 2011 at High Court (Kuala Lumpur)

2.0  CASE SUMMARY
The defendant, Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd had provided two murabahah financing facilities to Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin Ibrahim (‘the plaintiff’), enabling the plaintiff to acquire more shares in a company called ‘Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad’. The facilities were later restructured to the BBA facility following some breaches by the plaintiff. After defaulting the payment of the first instalment, the plaintiff claimed that the bank had mishandled the BBA facility with actions contravening the Islamic teaching. Therefore, he sought to declare the agreement to be null and void. The defendant had denied the claim, relying on the civil law and Shariah principle that the agreement is valid and binding to both parties.
            Thereafter, the bank carried out a debt recovery action ('the defendant's suit') against the plaintiff stating that the plaintiff had defaulted the terms of the BBA facility agreement. These two suits were later consolidated. Before the consolidation, the bank applied for summary judgment in respect of its suit but plaintiff refused so. The High Court allowed the summary judgment application. However, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeal.
            On the case management stage of this consolidated action, the plaintiff applied to refer certain questions to the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia ('SAC'), in pursuant to section 56 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009. This is due to the fact that the plaintiff had raised Shariah issues and according to the Act, such issues should be referred to the SAC. It was further added that the ruling made by the SAC shall be binding on the court. The plaintiff objected the application.


3.0  ISSUES
1) Whether there is any question concerning the Shariah matter arises?
2) Whether the court is functus officio from making a reference to the SAC as the question has previously been referred to the same board at the summary judgment process?
2) Whether a reference regarding the Shariah issue arises (if any) can still be made to the SAC?
3) Whether Section 56 and Section 57 of the Central Bank Act contravene the Federal Constitution?

4.0  PLAINTIFF CONTENTION
The plaintiff stated a few grounds for his contentions in this case. Firstly, the plaintiff had argued that the BBA facility was not Shariah compliance as it does not strictly follows the true manner and practice of a BBA facility, as according to the Shariah law. He added that the facility offered was practice with the presence of the element of interest, which is prohibited in Islam.
Secondly, the plaintiff questions the validity of the defendant’s act that had disposed his shares without his permission upon the default of payment. It is pertinent to note that, the disposal was carried out according to the terms of the agreement as the shares are the security in the BBA agreement. This leads to another question of whether the plaintiff obligation to pay his debt is still applicable, had the BBA facility truly departed from the shariah teaching.
It was also the plaintiff's argument that the execution of the BBA facility and the consolidation of the suits were effected before the Act came into force and therefore Section 56 and 57 of the Act could not be applied retrospectively.
Apart from that, he also argued on the constitutionality of Section 56 and 57 of Act 701. He questioned on the constitutionality of the SAC’s duty to interfere with the court’s duty.

5.0  DEFENDANT CONTENTION
The defendant had denied the allegation by the plaintiff who said that the BBA facility offered in non-compliance with the Shariah principle. The bank also argued that a debt is still a debt until it is settled and the parties to a contract are bound to the agreement until the disposal of their respective duties. Such was relied upon the civil law and the Shariah principle.


6.0  JUDGEMENT
Based on the contentions made by the plaintiff and the defendant, it was held that there are Shariah issues exist in this case and they need to be verified by the SAC. They are, inter alia, the legality of the BBA facility agreements according to the Islamic principle, the legality of the bank’s move of selling the Plaintiff’s share without his permission after his failure to pay back his debt, the validity of the agreement should it turned out to be departed from the Shariah principle, and the obligation of the Plaintiff to settle his debt if the BBA facility agreements were found to be contrary to the principles of Shariah.
In addressing the second issue where the plaintiff claimed that the Shariah issue in this case should be estop from being re-addressed to the SAC for reference, the court held that the said reference letter which was sent to the BNM during the summary judgment stage was indeed not issued to addressed the dispute between the parties before the court, but is an existing resolution which was issued before the dispute aroused. Therefore, the court is free to make reference the Shariah issue to the SAC.
In answering to the plaintiff’s argument that the BBA facility agreement should be null and void due to the fact that the agreement was made before the Act came into force and it should not be applied retrospectively, the court relies on the view that amendments to purely procedural statutes should be given retrospective effect and amendments that change substantial rights be given prospective rights. The amendment made had changes the gravity of the ruling made by the SAC. Previously, it is the discretionary power of the court to consider whether to follow or not on the ruling made by the SAC. However, now the SAC’s ruling is no longer the discretion of the court as it shall bind the decision of the court. But, it is important to differentiate the binding effect of the SAC’s finding in Shariah matters from the finality of the decision made by the judge. This fact is raised in the next issue.
Next, the court also found that Section 56 and Section 57 are not ultra vires to the Federal Constitution and thus valid. The court in this case had highlighted that eventhough the SAC’s ruling is binding towards the court decision, it is sophistic to say that the SAC holds the decision making role, instead of the court. It was further stated that it is practical to have an expert body such as the SAC to help sort out the difference of view regarding the shariah issue in the banking industry in Malaysia.
For the above reasons, the court held that the application is allowed with costs.













7.0  ANALYSIS
In this case, I am in my view agreed with the judgement made by Zawawi Ahmad J in dismissing the appeal and allowed appellant (BIMB) to refer to Syariah Advisory Council (SAC) pertaining validity of BBA contract. Before we go further into the discussion, let us take a look on the meaning of murabahah and also Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA) first since those are type of contracts entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant and becomes the vital elements in this case.
For murabahah, according to Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance website, it is a type of contract of sale entered into by bank and its client for the sale of goods at a price, plus an agreed profit margin for the bank[1]. Basically, murabahah is a particular kind of sale and not a financing in its origin because it does not involve loan. Since murabahah is a sale transaction, rules of Syariah must be complied with to avoid riba. In murabahah contract, transaction is done on a ‘cost plus profit’ basis which is the seller discloses the cost to buyer and adds a certain profits to it at the final selling price. So here, riba which rises depending on the term of deferred payment made can be avoided since there involves profits at agreed price by both parties. Payment can be made on the spot, in instalment or in lump sum after certain time. However, by time murabahah is said not to be syariah compliance by some Islamic legal experts since it may involve riba especially when penalty for late payment is imposed[2]. But still, it is considered as a valid contract in Malaysia[3].
Meanwhile, BBA is a ‘deferred payment sale’ or a type of loan agreement which works like a murabahah contract, but with payment generally made on a deferred basis and it is not transaction type of agreement like murabahah. The sale price quoted for the asset in the contract is inclusive of the profit. The typical assets for such contracts are the land, building, machinery and other equipment. Bai Bithaman Ajil is one of the most popular Islamic financing techniques used in Malaysia and it can be considered as a substitute of the finance lease. It is used by customers to purchase assets of substantial value in instalments, from which they can generate future cash flows. In this agreement, the customer gets the asset and is required to make payments as per the agreed tenure in instalments. The customer purchasing the asset is required to pay the profit to the financial institution that arranges the assets[4]. However, it is also said to have few weaknesses and some scholars contended that it is almost the same as conventional loan. But still, BBA contract is recognized in Malaysia and being used by most Islamic financial institutions like BIMB.
So the above are simple explanation regarding murabahah and BBA contract. Going back to Tan Sri Abdul Khalid’s case, plaintiff at first entered murabahah contract with BIMB and later on, due to some breaches by plaintiff, defendant offered to change it to BBA contract which is a loan agreement based on deferred payment. However, plaintiff defaults on the first instalment and later on challenges validity of BBA contract. Here we can see that plaintiff refused to continue with the contract made between him and BIMB and intended to put an end to the contract[5]. I am in my view, agreed with decision of Rohana J in referring the matter to SAC since the judge may not have the expertise to decide the matter pertaining Islamic banking and transactions. Since SAC on its ruling held that BBA is a valid contract so it is only right for the judge to rely on the ruling and decides the case in favour of defendant. However, as we can see from this case, plaintiff was not satisfied with the Court judgement so he made an appeal and challenged the validity of Section 56 and 57 of Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 (CBMA 2009) which gives more influence of SAC upon deciding each case of Islamic legal matters.
 Based on this case after appeal has been made, 4 issues was raised. The first one is whether there is any matter pertaining syariah issue arises, second, whether the High Court functus officio. Third, whether a reference regarding the Shariah issue arises (if any) can still be made to the SAC. Lastly, whether Section 56 and 57 of CBMA 2009 is constitutional.
Regarding the first issue on whether there is any matter pertaining syariah issue arises, the Court held that, it does involve Shariah issue. We can see based on this case that the contract signed between plaintiff and defendant was Murabahah and BBA type of contract which are part of the Islamic banking and financial agreement. Therefore, when dispute happened, obviously the issue of Shariah matter arises especially when plaintiff on his contention said that BBA was not Shariah compliance and the contract entered should be null and void.
On the second issue of whether High Court functus officio in deciding the case on favour of defendant, I believes that the court had comes up to the correct decision. The defendant, in bringing this matter seems to had misunderstood the situation. During the summary judgment stage, the reference made by High Court Judge to SAC was merely a request for information on whether there was any ruling by SAC regarding BBA contract. It has never touches on the matter discussed before this court in specific. Thus, to say that the court should be estop from bringing the case to the SAC so as to avoid repeating trial on the same matter is not right because the matter that is to be brought before the SAC this time is totally different. As there was no previous reference to SAC for the ruling, the High Court cannot be functus officio.
The third issue is whether a reference regarding the Shariah issue arises (if any) can still be made to the SAC. It must be noted that before 2009, upon issue involving Shariah matter, the Court may refer to SAC for ruling pursuant to Section 56 and 57 of CBMA 1958. The word ‘may’ here shows discretionary of the Court on whether to refer such matter to SAC or not. After the Act has been revised, Section 56 and 57 make it a must for the Court to make reference to SAC whenever issue on Shariah matter arises. The said provision is read as follow;
Section 56. (1) Where in any proceedings relating to Islamic financial business before any court or arbitrator any question arises concerning a Shariah matter, the court or the arbitrator, as the case may be, shall—
(a) take into consideration any published rulings of the Shariah Advisory Council; or
(b) refer such question to the Shariah Advisory Council for its ruling.
(2) Any request for advice or a ruling of the Shariah Advisory Council under this Act or any other law shall be submitted to the secretariat.
While Section 57 stated that;
 Any ruling made by the Shariah Advisory Council pursuant to a reference made under this Part shall be binding on the Islamic financial institutions under section 55 and the court or arbitrator making a reference under section 56.
Based on the above provision, on Section 56 of the said Act, the word ‘shall’ make it compulsory for any Court to make a reference and take consideration on any rulings made by SAC when the issue of Islamic Banking or syariah matter arises. That is why I agreed with the decision of Rohana J and Zawawi Ahmad J in allowing the Court to refer the matter pertaining validity of BBA contract to SAC. Since SAC decided that BBA contract is a valid contact, the Court in making reference to the ruling, may decide the matter accordingly. The rational of making reference to the SAC for ruling is that most of the judges in Civil Courts are not conversant with the rubric of Islamic Banking law or Shariah matter. Since the SAC have the expertism over such matter, reference to it should be made in order to avoid injustice to any of parties.
Lastly, the issue regarding constitutionality of Section 56 and 57 of CBMA 2009 on whether it is inconsistent with Federal constitution and should be void. It must be noted that in Federal Constitution under Article 74(1), parliament is empowered to make laws with respect to any matters mentioned in Federal List (List I) or Concurrent List of Ninth Schedule. Item 4(k) of List I provides that parliament is empowered to make laws in respect of Islamic Law and other personal laws for purposes of federal law. Since banking is a matter categorized under the Federal List and Islamic Banking Act 1983 as well as Central Bank Malaysia Act 1958 (CBMA) are under Federal Laws, Section 56 and 57 of CBMA are within parliament power to enact. Therefore, these sections cannot be said to be inconsistent with Federal Constitution.
Apart from that, Under Part IX, Article 121(1) of Federal constitution, the provision vests the judicial powers of federation in Courts grant by federal law. Therefore, the Court can perform the functions or to exercise power and jurisdiction. It is important to note that function of SAC is only to ascertain Islamic financial matters or business and it does not hear evidence or decide cases. That is the reason why the Court is allowed to cite Section 56 and 57 and make reference to the SAC for statutory ruling. Also, the ruling of SAC under Section 57 does not take away judicial functions and duties of Court, and that is why SAC like other expert, does not perform any judicial function in determining the ultimate outcome of dispute before Court and cannot be said to usurp or take away judicial functions of Court. Hence, I agree with Zawawi Ahmad J in stating that Section 56 and 57 are constitutional.


8.0  CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I agreed with the holding made by the Court in dismissing Tan Sri Abdul Khalid’s appeal and make an order for defendant to settle all the debt to BIMB. From this case, it is clear that Shariah matter does arise when it involves BBA contract which formed part of the Islamic Banking facilities. Apart from that, even though some expert said that the BBA contract might have allows the practice of the element of riba, it must be noted that Islamic Banking is still new in Malaysia and lots of improvements are being made from time to time in order to ensure that Malaysia Financial System to be more Shariah compliance. Therefore, regardless of criticism, BBA contract is still recognized in Malaysia and each party to the contract are binding to it.
In addition, pursuant to Section 56 and 57 of CBMA 2009, the provision making it compulsory to make reference to SAC whenever Islamic Banking or Shariah matter arises simply because SAC have the expertise over such. Also, we can conclude that Section 56 and 57 of CBA 2009 are constitutional and supersede the repealed CBMA 1958. All in all, SAC has imperative roles in assisting our current Islamic Financial Framework in order to make it more Shariah compliance.











9.0  REFERENCES
Ahmed Ali. (n.d.). Murabaha  process, documentation, and application of murabaha.

Institute of Islamic Banking & Insurance | Murabaha on Syari’a ruling. Retrieved on 22nd

IslamicBanker | Bai Bithaman Ajil. Retrieved on 23rd October, 2016, from

Muhammad Amir. (2009). Financing : Murabaha. Retrieved on 23rd October, 2016, from

Zul Kepli. (2013). Introduction to Islamic finance. Retrieved on 24th October, 2016, from



[1] Institute of Islamic Banking & Insurance | Murabaha on Syari’a ruling. Retrieved on 22nd October, 2016, from http://www.islamic-banking.com/murabaha_sruling.aspx
[3] Muhammad Amir. (2009). Financing : Murabaha. Retrieved on 23rd October, 2016, from https://islamicbankers.me/islamic-banking-islamic-contracts/in-focus-murabahah-contract/
[4] IslamicBanker | Bai Bithaman Ajil. Retrieved on 23rd October, 2016, from https://www.islamicbanker.com/education/bai-bithaman-ajil
[5] Zul Kepli. (2013). Introduction to Islamic finance. Retrieved on 24th October, 2016, from http://what-is-islamic-finance.blogspot.my/2013/06/analysis-cases-law-on-islamic-finance.html

Monday, 10 April 2017

Claim for Dependency

What is a claim for dependency?

As defined under section 7 of the Civil Law Act[1], claim for dependency is brought for the benefit of dependants to compensate them for loss of support as a result of the deceased’s death. It is a claim under section 7(1) of the Act for lost support brought by the dependants of a deceased person[2]. Basically, loss of support is the financial loss suffered by the dependant. It is not limited to food or sustenance but should equate with the pecuniary benefit the plaintiff receives from the deceased so as to enable him/her lead a certain life.

Section 7(2) and section 7(11)[3] of the Act precisely states dependants to include: husband, wife, parent, child of the deceased. Father, mother and grandparents are included in the definition of parents in the said provision. While child, it includes son, daughter, grandchild, illegitimated and adopted child of the deceased. As in the case of Zulkifli Ayob v Velasini K Madhavan & Anor[4], the court held that the dependants, for the purpose of section 7 of the Act, are wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased. An adopted child cannot therefore be a dependant unless the child is a legally adopted child.       

            It is vital to know that a posthumous child is included within the definition of dependant. This can be seen in the case of  Mariyayee & Anor v Nadarajan[5], where in this case, the plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of the estate and dependants of the deceased who sustained fatal injuries in an accident involving a bicycle ridden by the deceased and a motor car driven by the defendant on June 29, 1972, in Gopeng Road, Ipoh. On that day, the deceased was riding his bicycle from the direction of Ipoh towards Gopeng when a collision took place near the 1st milestone at Gopeng Road between his bicycle and a motor vehicle owned and driven by the defendant and proceeding in the same direction. The deceased left a widow and four infant children including a son born posthumously on whose behalf the plaintiff claimed for special and general damages. It was held that on the balance of probabilities, the defendant was negligent and wholly liable for the collision in which the deceased died, the posthumous child was entitled to claim relief as a dependant and in the circumstances an allowance of $20 a month for his support was fair and proper and general damages in the sum of $21,600 plus interest at 6% per annum should be awarded to the deceased's widow and children.

Siblings i.e. brothers and sisters are not included[6] as in the case of Chan Chin Min v Lim Yok Eng[7], where out of the RM750 allegedly contributed by the deceased, the direct benefit derived by the plaintiff, who was the mother of the deceased, was only RM375 as the rest was used for the benefit of the sister of the deceased who was not a dependant under the Act. It is the actual loss to the dependant that has to be taken into account. A divorced wife is not a dependant but the wife who deserts the husband prior to his death can only claim for dependency if she shows a significant prospect of reconciliation. This can be seen in the case of Payne-Collins v Taylor Woodrow[8], where the deceased’s divorced wife attempted to pursue a dependency claim upon his death. The court held that a divorced wife is not entitled to do so under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846.

A divorced wife is not being a dependant as opposed to wife who deserted her husband prior to his death, reference could be made to the case of Davis v Taylor[9]. In this case, the wife committed adultery and deserted the husband five weeks before his death. All attempts of reconciliation failed shortly before his death and the deceased instructed his lawyers to institute legal proceedings. Upon his death, she instituted a claim for dependency. Lord Reid stated as follows: “She claims under sec 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1824. In order to succeed she must prove that she has suffered ‘injury’ resulting from her husband’s death. Admittedly the injury must be of a financial character. In the ordinary case where the spouses were living together on the husband’s earnings, what the widow loses is the prospect of future financial support. There can be no question of proving as a fact that she would have received a certain amount of benefit. No one can know what might have happened had he not been killed. But the value of the prospect, chance or probability of support can be estimated by taking all significant factors into account”. The court decided that the test for a claim by a dependant under the English Fatal Accidents Act 1824[10] was whether there was a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the deceased, which meant in the case of a deserting widow, who had forfeited any right to maintenance, she had to show that there was some significant prospect, as opposed to a mere speculative possibility, of reconciliation with her husband had he lived; and that in the present case since the plaintiff had failed to establish such a prospect of reconciliation, her claim failed.            

             Perhaps in addressing the issue of ‘who are dependant?’ in the context of a wife, reference should be made to the position of a ‘wife’ married under customary rights. In other words, does a ‘wife’ married under customary rights fall within the definition of a wife in section 7(2)? In the case of Chong Sin Sen v Janaki a/p Chellamuthu[11], isteri yang sah kepada Muniappa Pillai a/l Marith Muthoo, where the plaintiff, the widow of the deceased who was killed in a road accident, brought an action for loss of support against the defendant pursuant to section 7(2) of the CLA 1956[12]. The defendant contended that plaintiff was not the lawful wife of the deceased because her marriage to the deceased contravened the provisions of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. The marriage was not solemnised according to the 1976 Act as the deceased and the plaintiff had only undergone a customary marriage on August 31, 1991. The court held that the respondent has the locus standi to commence the action against the defendant. The term ‘wife’ has not been defined in the CLA, the word should be given its natural meaning without any reference to the provisions of the 1976 Act as there is no requirement in the CLA that the term as found in section 7(2) of the CLA should be confined to a woman whose marriage was solemnised and/or registered under any prevailing Act relating to marriages and divorce. Still on the case of Chong Sin Sen v Janaki a/p Chellamuthu, isteri yang sah kepada Muniappa Pillai a/l Marith Muthoo, the court went further and stated that in the absence of express elucidation by the legislature, the word ‘wife’ found in section 7(2) of the CLA should not be restricted to a woman whose marriage has been solemnised and registered pursuant to the provisions of any prevailing Act relating to marriages and divorce. The Married Women Act 1957 provides that a ‘married woman’ includes any woman who has undergone a customary marriage and therefore that term would include a ‘wife’ found in section 7(2). Therefore the respondent having undergone a customary marriage with the deceased is a ‘wife’ and therefore has the locus standi to bring the action on behalf of the deceased’s estate. In Tan Sai Hong v Joremi bin Kimin & Anor[13], it was held that where the same question came up involving a Chinese customary marriage. The court held that section 7(2) of the Civil Law Act, merely states inter alia, that an action under section 7(1) of the Act may be brought for the benefit of a wife of a deceased. The section does not seek to differentiate nor make any distinction between a lawful and unlawful wife. Section 2 of the Income Tax Act, 1967 however defines a ‘wife’, as being a woman who is regarded by any law or custom, as the wife of a man. On the facts, the plaintiff admitted that she and the deceased went through a Chinese customary marriage which was never registered and the plaintiff and the deceased had lived harmoniously as husband and wife and had children out of that union.         

While loss of support, support means the pecuniary provision which furnished a livelihood, a source of means of living, subsistence, sustenance and maintenance. Loss of support is for all practical purposes translated into financial loss sustained by a dependant. The amount that makes up ‘loss of support’ is the amount the deceased would have given his dependants during his lifetime and this amount would be dependant primarily on the earnings of the deceased less his living expenses.

The test for loss of support is the direct benefit to the claimant. The claimant need not prove that he/she was totally dependant on the deceased’s contribution for his/her every day sustenance. In Muhamad bin Hashim v Teow Teik Chai[14], the deceased contributed RM700 towards the family. The father (who was claiming as a dependant) was earning RM500 and he was responsible for providing for two families. He needed the supplementary contribution of the deceased to provide for the families including himself and the court held that as a member of the family of the deceased he would have derived some direct benefit and awarded RM250 for eight years. In Chan Chin Min v Lim Yok Eng[15], it was decided that where out of the RM750 allegedly contributed by the deceased, the direct benefit derived by the plaintiff, who was the mother of the deceased, was only RM375 as the rest was used for the benefit of the sister of the deceased who was not a dependant under the Act. It is the actual loss to the dependant that has to be taken into account. In Yap Ami v Tan Hui Pang[16], where the court did not award any damages for dependency as the deceased before his death was an active partner in a firm and as such partner was earning RM1,450 per month and after his death that very sum was paid to the dependants as the deceased’s share of the profits. The dependants, therefore, did not suffer any loss.

To sum it all up, if claimant wants to claim for dependency, the claimant needs to be a person qualified under section 7(2) and he must prove that he has suffered ‘loss of support’ and the loss must be directly connected to a family relationship. Thus if the loss is due to contractual relationship, it cannot be claimed. In the case of Burgess v Florence Nightingale Hospital[17], the husband and wife were both professional dancing partners and the wife died due to the negligence of a surgeon. The court held that the basis of damages was that the benefit must be a benefit arising from the relationship as husband and wife, and allowed a modest sum for the deceased wife’s contribution to the joint living expenses but the claim for loss of services of the wife as a dancing partner was rejected.

In addition to the above, reference could also be made to the case of Maylon v Plummer[18], where the deceased operated a company which was ‘a one- man business’. His wife was the director and secretary to the company. Her salary for the above duties was an inflated sum which was banked into her husband’s account together with his salary for the general benefit of the family. The husband died in an accident and the wife claimed dependancy. The court held that: “... the salary which the plaintiff received via her husband’s bank account and which was used for the benefit of the plaintiff and her children was derived solely from the relationship of husband and wife between her and the deceased. The salary and the benefits were lost on the termination of the relationship by the death of the husband. Still on the case of Maylon v Plummer[19], in assessing the actual loss, the court deducted from the salary which was banked in, the market value of her services as director and secretary. The balance represented the benefit derived from the plaintiff’s relationship to the husband as his wife.

Loss of future earning

Section 7(3)(iv)(a) provides that to establish a claim for loss of future earnings, it must be shown that:

(i) the deceased was aged below 55 at the time of accident (as can be seen in the case of Lee In Fong v Zahara Bte Johan[20], where the court allowed a claim by the dependants of the deceased who was 63 years. The court held that if the deceased who is over 55 years old but in receipt of pensions which he used to support his family, the pension would not be considered ‘earnings’ for the purpose of dependancy under sec 7(3)(iv)(a) and therefore the age barrier in the sec would not apply). For a deceased, who had attained the age of 55 at the time of his death, his loss of earnings for any period after his death shall not be taken into account. For a deceased aged 55 years and above, there is deemed to be no financial support provided to dependants and therefore there is no dependency, in the eyes of the law.

(ii) it must be proved that or admitted that the deceased was in good health but for the injury that caused his death. Good health us not defined by the Act.

(iii) the deceased must have been receiving earnings by his own labour or other gainful activity prior to his death. ‘Prior’ to his death is synonymous with ‘before’ and it was held in Dirkje that ‘before’ means ‘at the time.’ The deceased must therefore be earning at the time of his death/her death. If the deceased was on no pay leave, temporarily laid off etc at the time of the accident, his earnings will be treated as nil and therefore, his dependants will not be entitled to loss of support.       
 
Considering everything, if the above 3 conditions are satisfied, the next step is to calculate the appropriate multiplier and multiplicand.

Bereavement

This is a new head of damages introduced into the dependency claim by the amendments[21].

It is available only to:
(a) spouse of the person deceased;
(b) parents of the deceased person, who was a minor, at the time of death and who never married. For claim for bereavement, the plaintiff must prove that the deceased was a minor and that he was never married[22]. It can never be presumed that where a person is a minor, he has never been married.
(c) the amount of the damage provided by the statute is RM10,000;
(d) the sum of RM10,000 awarded as damages for bereavement to the parents shall be divided equally between them. Perhaps it is vital to note that if there are two lawful widows, especially in cases involving Muslims, would both of them be entitled to RM10,000 each?

In the case of Noor Famiza bte Zabri & Anor v Awang bin Muda & Anor[23],  the deceased, the first plaintiff’s husband, was killed in an accident which was found to have been negligently caused by the defendant. The first plaintiff, as the spouse of the deceased, was granted RM10,000 for bereavement under section 7(3A) read with section 7(3B)(a). In Santhanaletchumy a/p Subramaniam v Zainab bte Saad & Anor[24], the High Court held that bereavement is not part and parcel of the general damages.

Another case is of Hooi Seong (The Beneficiary of Hooi Teck Weng, Deceased) v Ooi Pay Yeong (The Legal Representative of the Estate of Ooi Kok Teong, Deceased)[25], where it was reiterated that the court should only allow a claim for bereavement where it has been satisfied as to the marital status of the deceased. In  Ibrahim Ismail & Anor v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor & Anor Appeal[26], the Court of Appeal on appeal reduce the damages for bereavement since there was a finding of contributory negligence against the deceased. It is trite that the effect of a finding of contributory negligence is to entitle a defendant to a proportionate reduction of the damages awarded to a plaintiff.      
                      












Reference

1.      Balan, P. “Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Law.” Damages for Personal Injuries and Causing Death: A Critical Survey. Accessed May 12, 2015. http://www.commonlii.org/my/journals/JMCL/2004/3.html#Heading47

2.      Hafiz, Azrin. “Fatal Claims – For revision purposes only.” Slideshare. PowerPoint. 2007. 12 May 2015.

3.      Mohamed Nafees, Seeni Mohamed. “Fatal Accidents.” PowerPoint presentation. Northern University of Malaysia, Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia.

4.      Civil Law Act 1956 (Act 67): As at 20th April 2001. Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan: International Law Book Services: 2001.



[1] Section 7 of Civil Law Act
[2] Balan, P. “Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Law.” Damages for Personal Injuries and Causing Death: A Critical Survey. Accessed May 12, 2015. http://www.commonlii.org/my/journals/JMCL/2004/3.html#Heading47
[3] Section 7(2) and section 7(11) of Civil Law Act
[4] [2000] 1 MLJ 593
[5] [1975] 2 MLJ 267 HC
[6] Balan, P. “Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Law.” Damages for Personal Injuries and Causing Death: A Critical Survey. Accessed May 12, 2015. http://www.commonlii.org/my/journals/JMCL/2004/3.html#Heading47
[7] [1994] 3 CLJ 687 SC
[8] [1975] QB300
[9] [1974] AC 207
[10] Fatal Accidents Act 1824
[11]  [1997] 3 AMR 2217
[12] The Civil Law Act 1956
[13] [1998] 1 AMR 522
[14] [1996] 1 CLJ 615
[15] [1994] 3 CLJ 687 SC
[16]  [1982] 2 MLJ 316
[17] [1955] 1 QB 349
[18] [1963] 2 All ER 344
[19] [1963] 2 All ER 344
[20] [1992] 4 CLJ 2108
[21] Section 7(3B) of the Civil Law Act 1956
[22] Hafiz, Azrin. “Fatal Claims.” Fatal Claims. Accessed May 12, 2015. http://www.slideshare.net/azrinhafiz/fatal-claims
[23] [1994] 1 MLJ 599
[24] [1994] 4 CLJ 192
[25] [1995] 4 MLJ 670
[26] [2004] 1 MLJ 525

FATAL ACCIDENT IN ISLAM PERSPECTIVE

Under Islamic perspective, the one who is at fault for causing accident would be judged a bit different compared in Common Law. The driver would be punished depends on their behaviour in driving and evidence in proving it. In Syaria Law, a person who caused the accident would be liable to pay for ‘Diya’ or ‘Blood Money’. Diya is an Arabic word means “rendering” and would be used to pay for compensation for victim’s dependant when victims died in the accident. In Islam, Allah legislated Diya in order to protect rights and console the family of the victim and at the same time, to prevent people from committing such crimes since nature of law in Islam was legislated as a preventive measure for society.

However, it must be noted that Islam does not punish the individual for something that is out of their control. Means that those who made mistake is forgiven, but still, if the accident happened on part of negligence of the person at fault, then they still have to pay compensation for victim’s family. It must be noted that only the one who at fault must pay Diya to victim’s dependant. So, if the accident happened 100% by the victim’s fault, then the defendant would not be liable to pay for Diya at all. It is almost the same as contributory negligence under Common Law. In advance, if the accident happened partly on the fault of victim, and partly on the fault of defendant, then he would only be liable to pay on his part because Islam only punishes a person based on fault[1]. Meanwhile, where there are more than one person who at fault, so the punishment is jointly liable. They would be liable to pay for Diya for victim’s dependant[2].

On the other hand, according to Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen in his essay, ‘Ahkaam Hawaadith al-Sayaaraat’ or “Rulings on auto accidents”, when a passenger who got in the car with the driver by his own free will died by the cause of the driver’s aggressiveness in driving such as speeding more than provided speed, or slamming brakes for no reason, or because of negligence by the driver, then there would be two kind of expiation must be offered by the driver which is freeing a slave for each human life. If he cannot do that, then he must fast for two consecutive months and not break the fast except for a legitimate sharie excuse such as travelling, sickness, pregnant and it would be dangerous for the health of her and baby and any other excused provided under Islam. The driver would also be liable to pay for compensation for any property damaged or destroyed and diyah for the lives lost must also be paid by him. However, when the accident happened because the driver tried to avoid danger and the accident cannot be avoided, so, he would not be liable for expiation or Diya since a person who do good shall not be punished[3]. These rules has been stated in Al-Quran;

 “It is not for a believer to kill a believer except (that it be) by mistake; and whosoever kills a believer by mistake, (it is ordained that) he must set free a believing slave and a compensation (blood money, i.e. Diya) be given to the deceased’s family unless they remit it. If the deceased belonged to a people at war with you and he was a believer, the freeing of a believing slave (is prescribed); and if he belonged to a people with whom you have a treaty of mutual alliance, compensation (blood money — Diya) must be paid to his family, and a believing slave must be freed. And whoso finds this (the penance of freeing a slave) beyond his means, he must fast for two consecutive months in order to seek repentance from Allaah. And Allaah is Ever AllKnowing, AllWise”
(Surah al-Tawbah 9:91)

Apart from that, there is an issue under Islamic Law whether insurance company would be liable to pay for the victim’s dependant since Diya’ supposedly to be paid by the defendant himself and the hukum of involving with insurance company when it comes to fatal accident. According to Shaykh Ibn Jibreen, it is permissible because these companies are committed to bear costs incurred by the one who is insured by them. So, there is no reason to refrain from doing that as long as they are obligated to pay for the compensation.

So under Syaria perspective, we are obliged to obey government traffic rules and regulations that are not repugnant to stipulations of the shariah. This is under the reason that rules and regulations formulated for vehicles are under the jurisdiction of the government administration for safety and security of people at large. It is a religious duty to protect life and property. Then, if we violate any rule, we not only commit a sin, but also break our promise or vow that we have rendered to the government.

REFERENCES

Sarah. (n.d.). Caught in the accident in the UAE? Know your legal rights better! Retrieved

Khalid Saifullah. (n.d.). Fiqh of traffic- walking and driving. Retrieved 13th May 2015, from



[1] Fataawa Islamiyyah, 3/360 
[2] This is the view of the majority of scholars, including al-Hasan, ‘Ikrimah, al-Nakha’i, al-Thawri, Maalik, al-Shaafa’i, and the ashaab al-ra’i.
[3] This essay was published in the official journal of the Imam Muhammad ibn Sa’ood Islamic University, 12 Sha’baan 1409 AH.