1.0
INTRODUCTION
Duress is a part of defense for accused to exclude
themselves from liability or any crime committed by them. In this research, we
are going to discuss in details on duress defense provided in Malaysia, United
Kingdom (Common Law) and Singapore. The main objective of it is to find and
thus, clarify the similarities and differences on the application of the
defense among these States.
The defense of duress first appeared in the Indian
Penal Code 1860 and remained unchanged until now under Section 94 of Penal Code[1]. The
objective for this defense is to operate as an excuse since accused’s conduct
is regarded as wrongful in the eyes of society, but the circumstances in which
the accused committed such offense rendered him or her blameless. The defense
of duress recognizes that it would be unfair to convict and punish such a
person ‘whose only choice was the morally unacceptable one between either
self-sacrifice or breaking the law’.
In the case of Attorney General v Whelan[2],
Murnaghan J stated that duress is a defense because threats of immediate death
or serious personal injury so great as to overbear the ordinary powers of human
resistance should be accepted as a justification for acts which would otherwise
be criminal. On the other hand, duress is an excusary defense. An accused who
commits criminal offences under duress is excused from liability because he is
not held to be blameworthy enough to warrant a criminal sanction and make it as
a complete defense. Thus, if pleaded successful, the accused will be acquitted.
But accused carry a heavy burden of proof in proving he was under duress when
committing the offence. Meanwhile, it is the duty of prosecution to disprove
the duress beyond reasonable doubt, which means the evidence must be so strong
that there is no reasonable doubt that the defendant was not under duress.
There are few elements of duress. Those elements
include getting a direct, serious and fatal threat from coercer, the threat
must be directed at accused alone and it must be threat of instant death,
accused must have reasonable apprehension that the thread will be carried out,
have a duty to escape, do not place himself in a situation by which he became a
subject of threats, have physical presence of coercer, and accused must not
have any voluntary association with criminal group. These elements are crucial
in determining whether accused was under duress or not and judges will look on
the proofs and circumstances when the offences occurred.
1.1
Definition of Duress
In Malaysia, definition of duress
has been stated clearly under section 94 of Malaysian Penal Code. The provision
stated that,
“Except murder, offences included in Chapter VI
punishable with death and offences included in Chapter VIA, nothing is an
offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which,
at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death
to that person will otherwise be the consequence:
Provided that the person doing the act did not of
his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of
instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to
such constraint.”
Meanwhile in Singapore, definition of duress also
has been stated clearly under section 94 in Penal Code of Singapore. But since
Singapore also following Indian Penal Code 1860 like Malaysia, then the provision
and definition are almost as the same as Malaysian Penal Code. There are just
slight differences in the matter of interpretation of the said act by the
court.
On the other hand, duress in English law is a complete common law defense,
operating in the favour of those who commit crimes because they are forced or
compelled to do so by the circumstances, or the threats of another. The
doctrine arises in both English criminal law and in civil law. There are
no specific enactment specify the meaning of duress under Common Law. But, it
is generally accepted that definition of duress in civil law is every contract
that has been made under some form of pressure or threat which is offerer
threatens that unless the offeree accepts the terms offered, he will not get
the benefit of the offer. So long as a threat is just one of the reasons a
person enters an agreement, even if not the main reason, the agreement may be
avoided. Meanwhile, under criminal law, the defense of duress was laid down in M’Growther’s
case[3]
whereas a person has been committed crime because of serious threat from
another person to do so, but the threat must be persistent, imminent and
extreme to exclude him from the criminal liability.
2.0 POSITION OF
DURESS IN MALAYSIA
In Malaysia, defense of duress is
best described under section 94 of the penal code. The elements found under
this section are the moralized accounts of the defense focusing on the desserts
of the offender[4].
Duress, which is an amalgam of statutory, cannot be extended to apply where the
accused meets force with force in situations where self-defense is not
available. In fact, the defense of duress, in its statutory and common law
forms, is largely the same and both forms share the following common elements.[5].
On the ground of the first element,
the threat must be directed at the defendant and not some other person.
Reviewing the Malaysian Penal Code, the need to extend this aspect of section
94 and did so by recommending that the defense be available to cases where the
threats were directed at ‘any near relative of the defendant who was present
when the threats were made’, with the term ‘near relative’ defined to mean
parents, spouse, son or daughter.
The second element discussed here
is the need for the threat to be an instant death. Pursuant to section 94 of
the Code and the case of Public Prosecutor v Mohd Amin bin Mohd
Razali & 28 Ors[6],
Zulkefli b Ahmad Makinudin J stated that threat or compulsion from the accused,
is not a defense to the charge faced by the accused persons. If an accused is
to succeed in putting up such a defense, evidence must be produced to show
that there was a reasonable fear at that very time, of instant death. Mere
menace of future death is not sufficient in a situation by which an accused
person became subject to the threat of another person, whatever the threats
that may have been used against him.
On the other hand, the physical
presence of coercer is also needed even though it is not precisely stated under
section 94 of the penal code. This element can be referred to the case of Public
Prosecutor v Tanha Ghassem Mohamadkaram[7].
Under the law of duress, the threatener had to be present to execute the threat
of instant death if the accused failed to commit the offence. In this case, the
6th mobster was nowhere to be seen. There were also a number of police officers
at the scene attending to the accused at KLIA. Consequently, the court finds
there was no basis for thinking that the accused was obsessed with such
thoughts at the material time to the extent that he was deterred from seeking
police protection in Malaysia.
The phrase ‘reasonably cause the
apprehension’ appearing in section 94 injects an objective element into an
assessment of the defendants belief as to the existence and nature of the
threat confronting him or her.it is not simply that the defendant himself or herself believed (in which case the test
would be purely subjective) but what the defendant reasonably believed. This required
the trier of fact to consider what the defendants beliefs as to the threat was,
and then decide whether such belief was reasonably held[8].
On the other hand, citing a passage
from Gour's Penal Law of india [9],
which read as follows:
… the central point which must be
borne in mind is, that the right of private defense continues only so long as a
reasonable apprehension of the danger persists. When a number of injuries come
to be inflicted by an accused person in the exercise of the right of private
defense, As further explained in the case of Patrick Chau Fook Henn v Public
Prosecutor[10],
the important point which has to be determined is as to whether in the
circumstances in which the accused person was placed, the apprehension had
persisted in his mind when he inflicted a particular injury or injuries that
his life was in danger and whether, under the circumstances in which he was
placed, that apprehension was a reasonable ones.
Basically,
for the element of duty to escape from the coercer by the defendant does not
appear in the section 94 of the penal code unless a reasonable opportunity is
present. Indeed, it may be thought that the requirement of instant death
dispenses with the issue of escape because the extremely brief time connoted by
the word ‘instant’ inevitably renders absent any opportunity to escape. In
addition, when duress is pleaded merely involves a considerably longer time
period between the threats was made and the crime was to be committed. This
situation is well explained in the case of Natcha Dabkaew (Thai) v Public Prosecutor.[11]
The next element discussed is that
the harm threatened must be death. Before being amended, the Penal Code
referred the English Common Law position that recognizes threats of serious
bodily harm as a threat of death. Referring to Latif Khan AIR[12],
nothing short of fear of death will suffice for the defense to be applied.
Besides under section 94 of the Penal Code, this element is also mentioned
under Section 320 of the penal code which provides the definition of grievous
hurt. In the book of criminal law in Malaysia and Singapore, written by Stanley
Yeo, the differences between the both sections are explained briefly as section
94 only applies specifically to short of death but section 320 provides a
better option in the provision of duress which specifies that the harm
threatened must be death or serious harm. The term used under section 320 has a
wide meaning which includes both physical and psychological harm.
The
final element is that the accused must not have any voluntary association with
criminal group. The defense of duress is not available to person who commits
crimes as a consequence of threats from members of violent gangs which they
have voluntarily joined. A defendant who joins a criminal association which
could force him to commit crimes can be blamed for his actions. In joining such
an organization, fault can be laid at his door and his subsequent actions
described as blameworthy, where a person has voluntarily and with knowledge of
its nature, joined a criminal organization or gang which he knew might bring
pressure on him to commit an offence and was an active member when he was put
under such pressure, he cannot avail himself of the defense of duress. The defense
is not inevitably barred because the duress comes from a criminal organization
which the defendant has joined. It depends on the nature of the organization
and the defendant's knowledge of it. If he was unaware of any propensity to
violence, the defense may be available.[13]
3.0
POSITION OF DURESS IN SINGAPORE
It is well
known that Singapore’s Penal Code is virtually identical to the Indian Penal
Code 1860. Not long after its enactment, the Indian Penal Code received high
praise for its clear articulation and thinking concerning criminal
responsibility. However, even the best codes would lose much of their
attributes if they remained unaltered over an extended period. As a result, the
Penal Code struggles to remain the principle repository of the foundational
principles of criminal responsibility, having hardly any influence on the
development of subsequent penal legislation. The duress under Singapore’s Penal
Code also falls under section 94 as Malaysian Penal Code. Therefore, all the
elements involved in duress in Malaysia are also applied in duress in
Singapore.
In
the case of Public
Prosecutor v Nagaenthran a/l K.Dharmalingam[14], the Prosecution submitted that the
accused was guilty of the offence charged because he knew that he was importing
the controlled drug heroin into Singapore at the material time. In particular,
the Prosecution argued that the accused already had either actual knowledge or
imputed knowledge (in the form of willful blindness) of the actual contents
found in the Bundle when he was stopped at Woodlands Checkpoint on
22 April 2009. The court held that set out the principles governing the
defense of duress since the accused could not prove he was under duress in the
balance of probabilities.
Apart
from that, Stanley Yeo[15] stated
that in spite of the clear invocation under section 94, coercer must have
threatened to kill the accused instantly if he or she refused to break the
law. The term ‘imminent’ has crept into the judicial authorities on the
subject. The difference between the words ‘instant’ and ‘imminent’ is not a
mere matter of semantics. The former requires the threatened harm to be carried
out within a very short time and is synonymous with the word ‘immediate’. In
contrast, the term ‘imminent’ is synonymous with ‘impending’ and it permits a
longer time interval to occur between the accused’s refusal to break the law
and the coercer’s carrying out of the threat.
4.0
POSITION OF DURESS IN UNITED KINGDOM
In studying the defense of
duress through the common law perspective, there are some elements that need to
be focused on. Among the elements which are important in recognizing the duress
is the degree
of harm threatened. Apart from taking the generally accepted standard
that the threat of duress can only be raised upon the threat of death, it also
allows a lower degree of threat which is the threats of serious bodily injury.
The rational is such threat of injury believed to be capable of being as
compelling as a threat of death. Should there be an injury less harmful than
fatal or gravies, mitigation would be enough.
In 1985, Valderrama-Vega[16],
the defendant stated three reasons for committing cocaine smuggling. He alleged
that he and his family were threatened with death or injury if he did not
participate. He also claimed that he was in serious financial problem and at
the same time was facing a threat of getting his homosexual tendencies revealed.
The trial judge ruled that the jury should
concentrate on whether the defendant had committed the offence as a result of
the threats of violence in allowing the defense. The defendant was convicted
and appealed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal ruled that the jury should be
entitled to see the cumulative effect of other factors.
The presence of other elements such as financial
issue will open new assumption that even without the duress of threat forced
against him, he is might still commit the crime in order to satisfy the other
elements.
Secondly, on the question on who may be subjected to
the threat, the English Common Law stated that apart from threat against the
person himself, the member of the accused’s immediate family or the people who
the accused reasonably considered him as responsible towards their safety are
also put into account.
In the case of R v Shayler[17],
Shayler was a member of MI5 and had breached a declaration under the Official
Secrets Act in which he had signed. The judge ruled that the defense of duress
of circumstances was not available for him. He appealed against this ruling
contending that the disclosure was necessary to safeguard members of the
public. The appeal was dismissed. It was held that there is nothing confirms
that the action that will create imminent threats to life. He also failed to
recognized the potential victims or prove that he had responsibility for them.
The Attorney General v Whelan case
suggests that duress is a situation where the accused is put under a very great
threat of immediate death or serious personal injury that it is unbearable for
a human to endure[18].
It is pertinent to note that here that the threat must be of immediate threat.
But, the court usually more prefer to use the term imminent as it is more
proper to be used.
The strict definition of immediacy in terms of time
taken for an incident to happen could hardly be fulfilled. Thus, the court
usually included the surrounding circumstances into account in determining if
there are needs for the defense of duress is to arise.
In Abdul-Hussein[19],
the case involved the hijacking of a plane to escape persecution in Iraq, the
Court recognized that knowing exactly when the threat might be carried out
would still have an effect on a person's actions and held that the threat must
be 'imminent' and operating on the defendant's mind at the time of the offence.
In this case those defendants were threatened with the execution of themselves
and their family on their return to Iraq.
One must also have reasonable apprehension that the
threat will be carried out to establish duress. The accused must have a
reasonable ground to belief that the threat will be carried out. The common law agreed with the submission
that there are certain conditions in which its occurrence will affect the
judgment of the person on whether the threat will be carried out.
In the case of R v Bowen[20],
the appellant received electrical goods total up to £20,000 by deception. He
alleged that he was threatened that he and his family will be harmed. The
appellant had a low IQ of 68. He was convicted and appealed. The court held
that the appeal was dismissed and conviction upheld. A low IQ is not counted as
being a mental impairment.
On the other hand, Stuart Smith LJ mentioned that
the elements of age, sex, pregnancy, serious physical disability, a recognized
mental illness or psychiatric condition as the characteristics could be taken
into account. Such personal characteristic are not within the accused’s control
and it could affect their belief on the nature of threat.
However, there are certain limits ruled out where
the defense of duress is not made available. The defense of duress is shall not
be raised where the defendant could reasonably have taken evasive action. If
the defendant could, by any reasonable way secured the police protection or
avoid the crime they are expected to make the evasive action. Someone who
stands a chance to get the police protection but he fail to utilize this
opportunity should not be able to rely on the defense of duress. This was
clearly stated by Lord Lane CJ when he said that there is no doubt that someone
who was put under the duress should use any reasonable way to escape the duress[21].
For example, in the case of R v Hudson and Taylor[22]
where two teenage girls were scared into perjuring and pleaded the
defense of duress by threats. They alleged that they had been threatened with
serious violence. The trial judge ruled out the defense on the basis that the
threats were not sufficiently present and immediate. However, they were not
convicted, considering their age was relevant and police protection not always
seen to be safe.
The judge also made it clear that a defense of
duress must be preceded by a threat that is effective when the crime take
place. Should there be any safe evasive way available; the defense of duress
shall be invalid[23].
In R v Abdul-Hussain, the seven
appellants were Shiite Muslims from Southern Iraq. Abdul-Hussain had been
sentenced to death in Iraq following a confession which had been extracted by
torture. The other appellants were also fugitives facing death sentences in
Iraq. They had hijacked an airplane but upon negotiations, agreed to surrender.
At trial, the judge ruled that the defense of duress of circumstances could not
be put before the jury as there was a lack of the requirement of immediacy. The
appeal of the case allowed. The convictions were quashed. Imminent peril of
death or serious injury is a good element to plead for both types of duress.
The act of joining violent gang is considered as a
self-induced duress. The defense of duress cannot be raised by the persons who
did crimes because of threats from members of violent gangs which they have,
without being pressured, joined.
In R v Hasan, the appellant worked as a
driver for woman who works in the prostitution area. She then became involved
with another man, Frank Sullivan, who was a violent drug dealer. The appellant
was aware that Sullivan was a dangerous man. One night Sullivan and another man
told him to commit a ransacked a house belongs to the woman’s clients. He
threats him to do that that with him and his family’s safety on the line. The
appellant did so and was convicted of aggravated burglary. His defense of
duress was rejected by the jury. He appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed
his conviction. The Crown appealed to the Lords. House of Lords held that the
appeal was allowed. It was stated that if a person gets involved by voluntary
with people, known to him or he is capable of knowing that the person is
engaged in criminal activity and thus, he may be the subject of compulsion by
them or their associates, then he cannot rely on the defense of duress, in case
anything happened[24].
However, the successful of the defense depends on the nature of the organization
and the defendant's knowledge of it. If he was unaware of any probability to
get involve in violence, the defense may be available.
Meanwhile any murder related crimes such as murder,
attempted murder or accessory to murder are NOT entitled to get the defense of
duress. This is because the law put great appreciation for life. Thus, it is
irrelevant for someone to put other’s life at risk in order to save his life
and the life of the people he cherished.
This is paralleled with Lord Hale’s suggestion that
if a man is desperately assaulted, and his life is threaten, and there is no
way out but to follow the order by the assailant the fear of murdering another
person will not free him from the punishment of murder because in one’s natural
conscience, he would rather to die himself than killing an innocent person[25].
An example in case of murder that rejected the plea
of duress is the case of Abbott v The Queen[26].
Abbott had taken part in a brutal killing in fear of a death threats made against
himself and his mother. He held the victim while she was being attacked with a
cutlass and then buried her alive. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. He appealed his conviction relying on the defense of duress. It was held
that appeal dismissed and conviction upheld. The defense of duress is not
available for murder to a principal in the first degree.
Lord Griffith in his judgment for the case of R v
Howe and Banister[27]
had clearly stated that an attempted murder may be more intent upon taking a
life than a murder. Thus, those who commit attempted murder should hold the
same result as a murder and deserve no defense of duress.
5.0
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE
The previous discussion particularly explains in
details about the duress defense based on the law provided in Malaysia,
Singapore and also Common Law. Duress is an established principle of criminal
law that a person cannot be criminally liable just for doing any wrongs or
crimes. Pursuant to all related laws, we can dictate that criminal law provides
duress as an exception to the general principle of criminal law. The rationale
is that it is unfair for those who choose to break the law are held responsible
for the crimes that they commit is that the choice is not wholly voluntary. Referring
to the book of Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore, written by Stanley Yeo, duress
is a special form of the defense of necessity. Besides that, there are varies
definition of duress as has been mentioned at the beginning part of the law
assignment.
Even the duress under Penal Code remained unchanged
since Indian Penal Code 1860, but applications of duress are different in each Commonwealth
country. The first restriction on the defense is the harmed threatened must be
death. There is a relationship exists as stated in Penal Code and Common Law. Before
being amended, the Penal Code referred the English Common Law position that
recognizes threats of serious bodily harm as a threat of death. According to
the Common Law, apart from taking the generally accepted standard that the
threat of duress can only be raised upon the threat of death, it also allows a
lower degree of threat which is the threats of serious bodily injury. However,
Malaysian Law provides that in order to invoke this defense, the accused must
be in the position of “reasonable fear of instant death” (Section 94 of the
Act) and it must be imminent, extreme and persistent. Nothing short of fear of
death will suffice for the defense to be applicable as proved in the case of Latif
Khan AIR.[28]
Therefore, we could say that Common Law provides broader opportunity on the
application of this defense compared to other laws.
Other ground that has clear
distinction among the laws is that section 94 of the Penal Code, like the
Indian Penal Code requires that the threat must be directed at the accused
himself. On the other hand, Singaporean Law as amended in 2007, permits the
defense where the threat was directed at the accused ‘or any other person’. The
Singaporean position is too broad. Meanwhile, the threats may be directed at
some other persons according to English Common Law. They include a member of
the accused’s immediate family or someone for whose safety the accused’s
regarded himself to be responsible. Thus, it can be seen that the Singaporean
position is too broad. Reviewing the Malaysian Penal Code, there is absolutely
a need to extend this aspect of section 94. It is recommended for Malaysian law
to follow the idea of Common Law where the threats were directed at ‘any near
relative of the defendant who was present when the threats were made’, with the
term ‘near relative’ defined to mean parents, spouse, son or daughter.
Furthermore, the need for the
threat to be of instant death is required in laws from all States. So, we can
say that this point plays a vital part in determining the use of duress as a
defense. Court will definitely go through the facts based on the circumstances
available with care. Malaysian Law emphasizes on the term of instant and imminent.
In the local case of Tan Seng Ann v PP[29],
Malaysian Court of Criminal Appeal, the learned judge said ‘only fear of
intermediate death’ would be a sufficient excuse. Meanwhile, in the M’Growther
‘s case, Willan CJ stated that
duress to be pleaded successfully must be imminent, extreme and
persistent. Thereafter series of local case have described threat under section
94 of the penal code as having to be imminent, extreme and persistent. For
instance, in the local case of PP v Ng Pen Tin[30]
with the word “imminent” suggesting that the threatened harm need not be
carried out immediately or within a very short time span. In United Kingdom Law
(Common Law), most of the case the court held that the term imminent is more
proper to be used. In A-G v Whelan [1993] IEHC, the accused was
told to commit an offence and was subject to: “Threats of immediate death or
serious personal violence so great as to overbear the ordinary powers of human
resistance.
Section 94 of the Penal Code did
not mention clearly on the need to escape for an accused from his or her
coercer. Moreover, the word ‘instant’ in the provision had illustrated a very
limited period for the accused to escape as in the case of Chu Tak Fai[31]. The
Singapore High Court had justified this matter by looking at the accused’s
reasonable belief as it shown in the case of PP V Ng Pen Tine. In
this case, the court acknowledged that there can be a situation where no amount
of police protection would be enough to counter the threats. However, such
situation was regarded as exceptional. In short, the law will presume that the
police protection will be effective unless show otherwise. The situation is
also similar under the United Kingdom Law as referred in R v Hudson &
Taylor[32].
The final element is that the
accused must not have any voluntary association with criminal group. This
condition is a restriction under the criminal law in Malaysia, United Kingdom
and Singapore. A defendant who joins a criminal association which could force
him to commit crimes can be blamed for his actions. However, the successful of
the defense depends on the nature of the organization and the defendant's
knowledge of it. If he was unaware of any propensity to violence, the defense
may be available. In our point of view, the law is correct in assisting this
matter as the act of joining such an organization itself can be described as
blameworthy, where a person has voluntarily and with knowledge of its nature,
joined a criminal organization or gang which he knew might bring pressure on
him to commit an offence.
In a nutshell, duress is a type of criminal defense
that seem to be fair for accused. This is in order to exclude themselves from
liability or any crime committed by them where he or she at that time is lacked
free choice. There are indeed similarities and differences on the application
of the defense among the Criminal Law in Malaysia, United Kingdom and
Singapore. We acknowledged the few matters that maybe can be put into
consideration in Malaysian Law for improvement or law reform especially in
regards to the person who may be subjected to threat in duress defense as
discussed before.
6.0 References
Stanley, Y.
(2007). Criminal Law in Malaysia and
Singapore. LexisNexis Malaysian Law Sdn Bhd. Page 625-653.
All Answers Ltd.
(2014). Duress by Threats. http://www.lawteacher.net/criminal-law/cases/duress-1.php
retrieved on 23rd of October 2014.
Just, A. (2013).
The Defence of Duress. http://www.inbrief.co.uk/court-proceedings/defence-of-duress.htm retrieved
on 20th of October 2014.
Law, M. (2014). Explain How the Defence of Duress Operates. http://www.lawmentor.co.uk/resources/essays/explain-how-defence-of-duress-operates/
retrieved on 28th of October
2014.
Retrieved on 28th
of October 2014.
M, Souper
(2008). General Defences - Duress and
Duress of Circumstances. http://sixthformlaw.info/01_modules/mod3a/3_40_gen_defences/03_duress_and_circsm
retrieved on 20th of October 2014.
M, Hart.( 2012).
Duress 2012. http://www.slideshare.net/mariettehart/duress-2012-13058098?next_slideshow=1
retrieved on 19th of October 2014.
Shummi. (2012). Lecture on duress copy. http://www.slideshare.net/shummi/lecture-on-duress-copy retrieved
on 21st of October 2014.
P, Masons LLP.
(2014). Defence of Duress in Criminal Law.
http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Defence-of-Duress.php
retrieved on 20th of October 2014.
[1] Act 574
[2] [1934] in Irish Court Of Appeal
[3] (1746) 18 St Tr 301
[4] J.L. Hill, ‘A Utilitarian theory of duress’ (1999) 84 Iowa L. Rev.
275.
[5] Reuters .T. (2013) Criminal
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[6] [2002] 1 AMR 969
[7] 2013] MLJU 52
[8] codificaton, macaulay and the Indian penal code: the legacies and
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[9] pp 814–815
[11] [2014] AMEJ 0576
[12] . (1995) 20 Bom 394
[16] [1985] Crim LR 220
[17] [2001] EWCA Crim 1977
[18] Murnaghan J,1934
[20] [1997] 1 WLR 372
[21] Lord Lane CJ in R v. Sharp [1987] QB 853
[22] [1971] CA
[23] Widgery LJ, 1971
[24] Lord Bingham, 2005
[25] Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1736)
[26] [1977] AC 755 Privy Council
[27] [1987] AC 417
[28] (1995) 20 Bom 394.
[29] [1949] MLJ 87
[30] [2009] SGHC 230. A Singaporean case.
[31] [1998] 4 MLJ 246
[32] [1971] CA
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